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I Spinoza – Hegel – Vygotsky
When Vygotsky (1896-1934) was developing 
his original theory, he considered and critically 
assessed the ideas of numerous psychologists, 
philosophers, linguists, writers etc., as though 
he was working on an encyclopaedia. On one 
hand, it provided the vital force of the theory; 
on the other hand, expressing his vision of other 
theorists and writers’ opinions, Vygotsky made 
his theory profoundly clear to the reader. Spinoza 
(1632-1677) and Hegel (1770-1831) are among 
the mentioned philosophers; their points of view 
occupy significant positions in the essence of the 
theory by Vygotsky.
The fact that Vygotsky attempted to adopt 
the emotions theory by Spinoza is partially right. 
Vygotsky planned his research on the basis 
of Spinoza’s studies. In one of his books, the 
psychologist wrote the following:
Our research of the concept on the basis of 
Spinoza’s studies
– 1770 –
Eiji Kamiya. Problem of Self-consciousness and Conceptual Thinking in theTheory of Vigotsky: in the Spirit…
Kruger, Köhler: emotion in perception
The emotion’s concept is an active state; it 
is freedom:
Freedom: emotion in concept.
Autistic: thinking.
Sch: emotion decay
The great picture of personality development: 
the way to freedom. Revive Spinozism in 
marxist psychology (2006, p. 295)
As we can see from the quotation, Vygotsky 
does not only adopt the emotions theory from 
Spinoza; he also attempts to study the relations 
between “concept” – “emotion” – “freedom”. 
Well, what does “Freedom: emotion in concept” 
mean? When this fundamental question is clearly 
answered, we can understand the phrase “The 
great picture of personality development: the way 
to freedom”. As it is demonstrated below, I believe 
that we can find the answer to this question in 
“Ethics”. 
But as Vygotsky, obviously, relied on 
the dialectic logic of Hegel in his studies of 
the concept and the conceptual thinking (see 
Chapter 5 “Thinking and Speech”), we cannot 
interpret the quotation above as a switch from 
Hegel to Spinoza in the psychologist’s research. 
The question is how, according to the theory of 
Vygotsky, we can correlate the studies of Spinoza 
with those of Hegel. Disclosing the results of our 
study, we shall mention that the correlation point 
between the two philosophers can be found in 
their ideas of self-consciousness.
II Self-Consciousness  
and Conceptual Thinking  
in the Theory by Vygotsky
Roughly speaking, self-consciousness is 
defined as consciousness of one’s self, not of 
a thing (though, however, self-consciousness 
encompasses things in their ideal shape as an 
object for ego). Consequently, self-consciousness 
is associated not only with thinking alone, but 
also with consciousness as a whole (e.g., including 
emotions); but first of all, let us study its relation 
to thinking.
The problem of self-consciousness was 
pointed out by Vygotsky back in the mid 
1920-s; but the problem was more profoundly 
studied in respect with adolescence when self-
consciousness is formed, such as in “Paedology 
of the Adolescent” (1931 / 1984). 
But if we decide to separate Vygotsky’s idea 
of self-consciousness from his earlier works, 
we find two postulates of great methodological 
significance:
1. Self-consciousness follows the same 
mechanism as cognition of other people; 
thereby, we cognize ourselves similarly to the 
way we cognize others: “The mechanism of 
consciousness of the self (self-consciousness) 
and the cognition of others is the same; we are 
conscious of ourselves because we are conscious 
of others, and with the same method as we are 
conscious of others, because we are the same 
vis-à-vis ourselves as others vis-à-vis us” (1924 / 
1982, p. 52).
2. Self-consciousness is the consciousness 
of consciousness [to a thing]: “as Plekhanov has 
correctly established, self-consciousness is the 
consciousness of consciousness” (1927 / 1982, p. 
413).
We would like to point out immediately 
that these two postulates were included into 
the self-consciousness ideas expressed in “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” by Hegel (1807 / 
2002).
Moreover, in “Paedology of the Adolescent” 
Vygotsky expresses another important idea 
directly associated with the correlation between 
self-consciousness and thinking. The new 
postulate is the following:
3. Self-consciousness and conceptual 
thinking are inextricably intertwined; without 
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self-consciousness, conceptual thinking would 
not exist, and without the latter, the first would not 
exist either. Therefore, self-consciousness is the 
pre-requisite and the consequence of conceptual 
thinking.
Besides, we shall demonstrate how 
Vygotsky understood conceptual thinking as 
a form and contents. From the point of view of 
form, conceptual thinking in general is thinking 
by concepts. Before that, during its development, 
thinking operates some “concept equivalents”. 
At first, an equivalent is a syncretic image that 
transforms into a complex later. Therefore, the 
forms of thinking are developed as image – 
complex – concept.
Of course, there are specific contents of 
thinking related to each form. According to 
Vygotsky, the contents typical of conceptual 
thinking forms are the following:
1. The contents of thinking are usually 
related to cognition and understanding of the 
surrounding world. But conceptual thinking 
leads to “revelation of the deep connection 
underlying reality, to the cognition of relations 
governing reality, to the systematization of the 
cognized world with a grid of logical relations” 
(1931, p. 301 / 1984, p. 65-6).
2. Conceptual thinking becomes a 
means of understanding others and cognizing 
social consciousness: “a concept does not only 
systematize the surrounding reality and serve as 
the main means of cognition. It is also the main 
means for understanding the other, for adequate 
digestion of the historically developed social 
experience of the humankind. Concepts are the 
first things used by an adolescent to systematize 
and cognize the world of public consciousness” 
(ibid, p. 301-2, p. 66).
3. Self-consciousness develops along with 
the formation of concepts: “A word is just as much 
a tool for understanding others, as it is a tool for 
self-understanding. From the moment of birth, 
a word is a tool the speaker uses to understand 
himself, to apperceive his perceptions. Therefore, 
the intensive development of self-perception, self-
observance, intensive cognition of internal reality 
and the world of one’s own emotions only happens 
when the concepts are formed. As W. Humboldt 
rightfully remarked, a thought becomes clear 
in a concept only, and an adolescent becomes 
capable of understanding himself and his inner 
world for real only when the concepts are formed. 
Otherwise the thought cannot achieve clarity or 
become a concept” (ibid, p. 300-1, p.65).
Therefore, self-consciousness and 
understanding of the self only become possible 
through the formation of concepts, but there 
occurs the reverse dependence: with no clear 
self-consciousness, concepts are impossible 
either. A concept becomes clear only due to 
the development of self-consciousness. It is the 
newest contents of the conceptual thinking form.
It raises a theoretical problem that requires 
a profound study. How is such single, individual, 
subjective thing as self-consciousness can be 
transformed into a common, objective one, which 
is conceptual thinking and a true concept? The 
answer to this question is hidden in the process of 
movement or development of self-consciousness.
III Why Do We Need  
“The Phenomenology of Spirit” by Hegel?
Putting two theories against each other 
and comparing themselves to each other is not 
usually productive. The intention to regard the 
theory of Vygotsky through the prism of Hegel’s 
philosophy, especially “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit”, needs to be justified. Indeed, just like 
Hegel’s philosophy, the theory of Vygotsky is 
dialectic, but it is not enough. The comparison 
should be based at least on the contents of the 
theory by Vygotsky.
Thoroughly studying “The Phenomenology 
of Spirit” we can find certain intersections 
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and parallels with the theory of Vygotsky. It 
really contains certain postulates underlying 
the psychologist’s theory. But where are the 
intersection points, the tangent lines, the 
parallels? We can find them in Hegel’s theory 
of consciousness (before self-consciousness) 
expressed as the following development pattern: 
“sense-certainty” – “perception” – “mind”.
1
First of all, let us study the first element of 
the pattern, sense-certainty, as the lowest level 
of consciousness. Sensually, knowledge cognizes 
the single “This”, located “here and now”, and the 
subject of such knowledge is a single “this person”, 
also being “here and now”. Therefore, sense-
certainty “has not missed anything of the object, 
seeing it in its wholeness” and consequently, this 
knowledge demonstrates “the richest cognition”, 
“the cognition of endless richness” (1807 // 2002, 
p. 51). However, it is just an illusion of cognition. 
Because if “now” with time transforms into a 
new “now”, a person also changes from “here” 
to “right here” (a new “here”) and so on, and 
attempting to abstract something from the totality 
of the numerous “here and now”, e.g. in the sense 
of sense-certainty, we get “the most abstract 
and the poorest of the truths”: the immediate 
“existence” (ibid). Hence, on one hand, Hegel 
wants to speak of an “illusion” of cognizing the 
rich world to the full, and on the other hand, he 
speaks of the essence of sense-certainty which 
can never encompass anything but the poor and 
pure “existence”.
At the point of intersection between the ideas 
of Vygotsky and Hegel we should pay attention to 
the idea of mediation. Hegel deals with mediation 
from the negative point of view. He wrote that as 
sense-certainty was “knowledge… immediately 
composing the object”, e.g. “the knowledge of 
the immediate or the existent”, then studying this 
certainty we can never do it without “the help of a 
concept” (ibid). From the negative point of view, 
at the moment of grasping an object a concept 
(and further, the image and the idea) works as a 
mediator. Moreover, Hegel believes that within 
the context of sense-certainty the immediate 
object cannot be expressed with words, speech 
and language. What does it mean? Here is what 
Hegel wrote:
They “mean” this bit of paper I am 
writing on, or rather have written on: but 
they do not say what they “mean”. If they 
really wanted to say this bit of paper which 
they “mean”, and they wanted to say so, that 
is impossible, because the This of sense, 
which is “meant”, cannot be reached by 
language, which belongs to consciousness, 
i.e. to what is inherently universal (ibid, 
p.58).
Let us clarify the quotation. Imagine that 
I have written something on a bit of paper. If, 
pointing at this single paper being “here and now” 
I ask anyone what it is, I am likely to receive the 
answer that it is a bit of paper. But at the moment 
the paper meaning “paper in general” abstracts 
the “This” being “here and now”, they go beyond 
the dimension of sense-certainty. They enter 
the dimension of perception, which relies on 
universality as its core principle.
Hegel gives an interesting remark: speech 
has “the divine nature of directly turning the 
mere “meaning” right round about, making it 
into something else” (ibid, p. 58). Following 
Hegel, the “divine” action of turning the sense-
certainty as pure singularity into perception 
as pure universality can be performed through 
the mediation of word, speech and language. 
Vygotsky points out that mediated with words, 
perception tends to generalize the object, 
and, moreover, take this speech mediation for 
the main principle of understanding human 
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psyche. This is a profound point of intersection 
between the theories of the philosopher and the 
psychologist.
2
Speaking of the parallel between them, we 
should say that it becomes especially clear in the 
understanding of self-consciousness. Let us quote 
a text where Vygotsky directly points at Hegel’s 
idea of self-consciousness.
[Concerning that the pattern of self-
consciousness development is a certain 
historical stage in the development of 
personality]. This concept corresponds to 
the pattern of development that we find in 
Hegel’s philosophy. In contrast to Kant, for 
whom a thing in itself is a metaphysical 
entity not subject to development, for 
Hegel, the concept itself “in oneself” 
means nothing over than the initial moment 
or stage of development of the thing. 
Specifically from this point of view, Hegel 
considered a seedling as a plant in itself and 
a child as a man in himself. All things are 
in themselves from the beginning, Hegel 
said. A. Deborin … considers it interesting 
that in formulating the question in this way, 
Hegel inseparably connects the knowability 
of a thing with its development or, using a 
more general expression, with its movement 
and change. From this point of view, Hegel 
justifiably pointed to the fact that the ego 
serves as the closest example of “life for 
oneself”. “It can be said that the man differs 
from the animal and, consequently, from 
nature in general mainly by the fact that he 
knows himself as ego.
The concept of self-consciousness as 
developing definitely liberates us from the 
metaphysical approach to this central fact 
of the transitional age (1931 / 1984, p. 232).
As in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel 
philosophically presents the dialectic movement 
(development) from “self-consciousness in itself” 
to “free self-consciousness”, then, considering 
the foregoing, we can believe that Vygotsky did 
consider Hegel’s studies. Later we will point at the 
parallel relations between the two researchers.
3
Let us make one more remark. In “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” there are the same 
concepts that act as a tangent line between Hegel 
and Vygotsky: “in oneself”, “for others” and “for 
oneself”. Taking pointing gesture as an example, 
Vygotsky characterizes the gesture in the three 
mentioned stages (failed act of grasping, same 
action perceived by an adult, birth of the pointing 
gesture) and, moreover, refers the three stages 
to the general pattern of cultural development 
of a child (1929 / 2003, p. 1021, 1931 / 1983, p. 
143-4). At the same time, pointing out at the 
“differentiation of Hegel” (1931 / 1983, p. 143), he 
hints at the fact that the mentioned three stages 
are inspired by the philosopher. Even though 
Hegel does not use the expression “for others”, 
he writes “for another” speaking of the process 
of self-consciousness development described in 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Partially, the 
expression “for another” used by Hegel is similar 
to “for others”. But let us speak about it later.
IV Mind – Self-Consciousness – Reason
A great peculiarity of the ideas of self-
consciousness, expressed in “The Phenomenology 
of Spirit” by Hegel, is the differentiation between 
mind and reason, setting self-consciousness 
within the process of evolution from mind 
to reason, and seeing self-consciousness as a 
developing phenomenon.
But before considering self-consciousness we 
need to emphasize that in “The Phenomenology 
of Spirit” everything is described as flowing, 
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moving, and developing. The dialectics itself and 
even the truth, which is obviously a permanent 
thing, are also moving. Such significant patterns 
as establishment (determination) – denial 
(cancellation) – denial of denial (cancellation of 
cancellation) are always found; but, for instance, 
the expression “dialectics of sense-certainty” 
(1807 // 2002, p. 57) means “dialectics specific 
of it [being]” in the dimension of sense-certainty 
(ibid, p. 52). Therefore, there is its own dialectics 
in every dimension of knowledge (and obviously 
their core would be the same), making dialectics 
a vital property. In the works by Hegel the same 
can be said about the words “truth” or “true” as he 
claims that even the truth has the ability to move. 
For example, Hegel operates such expressions as 
“the truth of sense-certainty” (ibid, 53), “the truth 
of perception” (ibid. 62, 63), “the truth of mind” 
(ibid, p. 81). At the same time the specific essence 
revealed by a specific movement of knowledge at 
each of its stages is the truth.
But to clarify the problem let us leave the 
great movement of knowledge, i.e. “the dialectics 
of the human” grasped by the mind, aside, and 
point at each specific “truth” and its restrictions 
on the intellectual steps of sense-certainty, 
perception and mind within the relations between 
“the thing” and “the consciousness”.
1
As it has been mentioned, the truth specific for 
sense-certainty and its restrictions that present the 
relations between the world as it is and the direct 
“self”, is the knowledge possessing all the richness 
of things being “here and now”. But if we separate 
(isolate) them, then, to our surprise, they lose 
their richness, turning into nothing but the empty 
“existence”. This cancellation leads to the fallout 
from the world filled with light, green, flowers 
and wine into the world of darkness. Surprised, 
we cancel it too, returning to singularity, i.e. to 
“here and now” without universality. Therefore, 
the movement of knowledge within the dimension 
of sense-certainty draws nothing but a circle on a 
plain. This simple circular movement from pure 
singularity to empty universality and back to 
pure singularity makes a real impact on the idea 
of consciousness in the relations between “the 
thing” and “consciousness”, including mind.
2
Unlike sense-certainty, the perception that 
occurs at the next stage presents more than just 
mediated knowledge, but also simple universality. 
It happens at the moment of “indication” and 
at the movement of the “thing” (ibid, p. 60). 
“Indication” means that the word “watch” refers 
to any watch. This is what pure universality is 
about. If sense-certainty presents singularity, 
then perception presents universality, but it is 
not the end. The perception goes further until 
it reaches the next dead-end. Perception of a 
thing is based on a simple integrity of “one”, but 
leads to “differentiation” within this integrity, 
i.e. “numerous” properties are cognized in the 
“one”. It is similar to that how Hegel pointed out 
that “one” thing, such as salt, has “numerous” 
properties. “Salt is white and tart and cubical 
and heavy etc.” (ibid, p.61). All these properties 
mean that the plurality of the sense-certainty 
knowledge manifested in the singularity is now 
demonstrated in the dimension of universality 
(ibid), but they cannot mutually influence each 
other. Consequently, consideration of the thing 
within the dimension of perception does not go 
any further. As Hegel mentions, “the white makes 
no impact on the cubical and does not change it; 
neither of them influence the tart etc.” (ibid, p.61-
2). Another dead-end is found when there is an 
illusion that occurs along with perception. Hegel 
believes that if a thing is “true” in the dimension 
of perception, then consciousness is “variable and 
immaterial for itself”, which may lead to illusions 
(ibid, p. 63). Moreover, speaking about the first 
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dead-end, Hegel points out that many aspects of 
the thing originate not from the thing, but from 
themselves, thereby “unfolding to us as seen by 
our eyes, absolutely different from the way they 
were expressed in language, etc.” (ibid, p.65). So, 
it is also related to the second dead-end.
3
Now let us study the mind, considering 
the difference Hegel outlines between the 
mind and the reason. The action that starts the 
differentiation within the “one” of the thing 
begins in the dimension of perception, where 
differentiated properties were not related to each 
other. As an object of perception, a thing has 
some numerous properties which do not lead to 
the unfolding of such (see the example of salt). 
Getting over this situation, the mind learns how to 
correlate different properties to each other. Hegel 
studies such properties on the example of classical 
mechanic motion. It encompasses the “external 
manifestation” of force and the “force returned 
into itself from its external manifestation” (ibid, 
p.73). Frankly speaking, that is the action and 
counteraction of force. Though the force is divided 
into two components here, “the existence [of the 
two forces] is rather a pure establishment through 
something else”, and therefore, we can recognize 
“every force due to another property” (ibid, p.76), 
but we cannot know more than that. It means that 
we find no opposition or negation as “these forces 
do not have any substances they could bear or 
preserve” (ibid, p. 76-7). Finally, the mind enters 
the phenomenon through the concept of force 
and starts to penetrate into the “inner nature” 
of the thing, at the same time limiting force to 
gravity, dissolving different laws of forces in the 
universal law of gravity, returning the mind from 
the singularity of the thing to its unconditional 
universality. As it has been said above, the empty 
universality is achieved through the abandonment 
of the singularity, which is typical for thinking 
before entering the dimension of mind and later, 
within it. That is what Hegel referred to as “the 
word play” (ibid, p. 77).
4
Let us make several remarks concerning 
the interconnection between the two properties 
and the cancellation of these relations between 
the properties. “Left” can happen due to “right” 
and simultaneously, the latter can happen due 
to the first. But moving these properties around 
the plain we see how “left” can turn into “right”. 
Even though the two properties make sense as 
relative properties in the same area, there is no 
other meaning arising from the “opposition” of 
the two. At the same time, it is everything the 
interdependence between the two properties 
may mean, as the properties are simple (and 
consequently, empty) concepts. The “opposition” 
between them is not a true opposition. It is 
a peculiarity of mind Hegel referred to as 
“common human sense” (ibid, p. 69). What is 
the point of view of reason superior to mind? Let 
us study it on the example of the “existing” and 
the “bearing”. Just like “left” and “right”, the 
“existing” and the “bearing” first find themselves 
in the relations of interdependence. If we see a 
creature as an ego, then I exist because I was 
the “bearing” before I was born, and because I 
also exist until I die when I become a different 
“bearing” in the memories of me kept by others. I 
exist in the time restricted by the two “bearings”. 
This is cognition in mind. If we said, “I will die 
because I was born” or “I was born condemned to 
die”, it would express another deeper thought that 
does not go beyond the boundary of mind. This is 
the “word play”. Within the mind, the knowledge 
can see the “bearing” inside the “existing”. At 
the same time, there is the “existing” inside the 
“bearing” (the integrity of being and not-being). 
From the point of view of substance and in the 
dimension of cells, my life can be illustrated as 
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follows. The genesis of an animal cell and the 
division of the cell always has an “apoptosis-cell” 
or the “programmed cell death” when the “dying 
cell” becomes more compact and gets engulfed 
by the surrounding cells (Lewin, Benjamin et 
al., 2007, p. 534). Let us find an analogue in the 
dimension of spirit. When I have a new idea, I 
can distinguish between the new idea and my old 
ones by comparing and contrasting them. When a 
new idea gets closer to the truth than the old one, 
we limit the scope of the old idea or we transform 
(cancel) it by modifying it. Therefore, we 
prepare it for the death. Therefore, the “existing” 
encompasses the “bearing”.
5
But according to Hegel’s idea, it takes 
a great leap from knowledge concerning 
“thing – consciousness” to the knowledge of 
“consciousness – consciousness” to reach the 
reason from the mind. Self-consciousness, the 
necessary medium for the human knowledge to 
penetrate into the “inner nature” of the thing, is 
developed in the process. As Hegel wrote, the 
“inner nature” of a phenomenon hides behind 
a “curtain”. It leads to the dead-end in the 
immediate “thing – consciousness” relation, i.e. 
in the sense-certainty, perception and mind. We 
need to look behind the curtain to see “the inner 
nature in the inner nature” (ibid. p. 92). It means 
that it is the self-consciousness that is required.
V Development  
of Self-Consciousness
In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” all 
psychological and everything that originates 
from “sense-certainty”, “perception”, “mind”, 
“self-consciousness”, “reason”, and “spirit”, 
being the objects of this study, are investigated 
as flowing and evolving. For this reason we also 
need to consider the process of transition from 
self-consciousness in itself to the “free self-
consciousness”. Hence, we need to unfold what 
happens in the process of transition from the ego 
as an immediate integrity, from the tautological 
ego encompassed in “I am I”, from the vague 
cognized ego to free self-consciousness where an 
object moves around concepts.
From Hegel’s point of view, at the moment 
of decay of the “one” as an immediate integrity a 
differentiation within a thing or an object occurs. 
Of course, it is not any differentiation that may 
occur, but it is the differentiation of properties 
found in an opposition with each other. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 7 of “Thinking and 
Speech”, the differentiation of a linguistic form 
of a word and its meaningful contents with an 
associative connection between them is a static 
differentiation, where the initial bond between 
sound and meaning does not unfold any further. 
But if the opposition of two properties is allowed, 
the differentiation causes the difference in the 
inner speech where the decay of the linguistic 
form acts as a cause for the development of its 
meaningful contents. For self-consciousness such 
properties are “own” and “other”.
It is demonstrated by the comparison of 
self-consciousness to consciousness before self-
consciousness performed by Hegel. According 
to him, during the investigation of self-
consciousness i.e. the new form of knowledge 
(knowledge of the self) in comparison with the 
previous form (knowledge of the “other”) the last 
knowledge disappears, while the main properties 
of this knowledge are retained. Here the “simple 
independent existence for the consciousness” 
disappears (1807 // 2002, p. 93-94). Therefore, 
the knowledge of the other (knowledge on the 
level of feeling, perception, or mind) turns into 
the being for itself through the realization of the 
ego (development of self-consciousness). Hence, 
we can consider the basic differentiation arising 
in the self-consciousness to be the differentiation 
between the “own” and the “other”.
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The cognition of the way the “own” and 
the “other” penetrate into each other and find 
themselves in oppositions to each other is our main 
task. Let us consider this task, following the three 
postulates of Hegel: (a) immediate consideration 
of the undifferentiated ego, (b) transition from 
the immediate ego to the mediating ego, (c) 
reduplication of self-consciousness.
The cognition of one’s own ego begins 
with the immediate cognition of the “pure 
undifferentiated ego” (p.98). This is the kind of 
cognition as “tautology of no movement: I means 
I” (p.94). This ego in a certain sense is a stable 
integrity. But the self-consciousness does not 
stop there and goes beyond “itself”. The stable 
integrity presents only the initial point of self-
consciousness. It is especially important to find 
what moves self-consciousness further.
The answer can be found in the second 
definition, though it is a little abstract: “This 
immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing 
mediation; it has its being only cancelling the 
independent object, in other words it is Desire. 
The satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflexion 
of self-consciousness into itself, is the certainty 
which has passed into objective truth” (p.98). 
The phrase “this immediacy is itself, however, 
thoroughgoing mediation” means that during 
the cognition of the ego, the immediacy of the 
first cognitions or the immediate cognition of 
the ego begins acting as mediating. What does 
this mediation refer to, what does it mean? The 
transition to such mediation is needed, first of 
all, for the consciousness returned into itself and, 
therefore, to attract the contents of knowledge 
about the other. Therefore, at the establishment 
of self-consciousness, though the object is a 
negative element for self-consciousness, it returns 
into itself just like consciousness does (see p. 94). 
So, the first moment unfolding this mediation is 
the returning of consciousness from otherness 
to itself, the transition from the external thing 
to the thing for the own. This is the end of pure 
knowledge of the other and the beginning of 
visible establishment of self-consciousness. But 
Hegel believes that this development happens in 
the tautological ego phase.
The second moment makes the self-
consciousness move, and this moment is the 
“desire” and “reflexion” mentioned in the second 
part of the postulate (b) quoted above. Here it is 
important to remark the concept of “life”. The 
meaning of Hegel’s phrase “due to this reflection 
into itself it (the object – E.K.) becomes life” is, I 
believe, the fact that an external object becomes 
a thing, a being for itself, thereby making it alive 
and visible. Here self-consciousness begins to 
differentiate between its own and the existence 
(especially the object returned into itself), forming, 
therefore, the differentiated existence and being 
in the aspect of sense-certainty of perception, and 
also the “being reflected into itself” (ibid). Saying 
that the “object of immediate desire is something 
living” (ibid), Hegel indicates that the reason for 
it that the relation of mind to the “inner nature” of 
things, the inherent reality is the “distinguishing 
of what cannot be distinguished” (ibid). In this 
context and considering that the object of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” is the intellectual 
aspect of an individual, the “desire” by Hegel 
represents an intellectual need. Penetrating into 
the “inner nature” of thing, the mind comes to 
the conclusions both drawn from the outside and 
derived by formal logic. Therefore, we may think 
that the “desire” is the wish to go deeper into the 
“inner nature” of the thing, that it is the motivation 
of assisting the transition from the mind to the 
reason (if we characterize the future of the mind 
from the point of view of the “desire”, then it is 
the universality within the “pushing everything 
away from itself”).
If our investigation was complete at this 
point, the third postulate of the reduplication 
of self-consciousness would not be required. 
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The thing that used to be external returns into 
itself, becoming an internal object for thinking, 
becomes alive and begins to move. However, if 
we realized that the desire for life makes more 
profound thoughts move, then ego would remain 
static. Hegel tries to cover both the motion of all 
the “own”, and the motion of the object in all the 
“own” that used to be “external”. It means that he 
tries to understand how the “developing and one’s 
own development” occur (ibid, p. 97). In this 
respect Hegel studies such dialectic concepts as 
the integrity of independent formations, integrity 
and differentiation, independence of the other 
and cancellation of the independence, opposition 
of self-consciousness and life, reformation of 
the ego and being for oneself, the genus and 
the single. But the most important point for us 
is that without self-consciousness a thing as a 
being for itself is not born; that the integrity and 
differentiation within the ego continue endlessly; 
that the form of knowledge becomes individual 
through the ego; that the own self-consciousness 
and the self-consciousness as the “other” 
originate from that form; that the “reduplication 
of self-consciousness” happens here. All these 
manifest themselves in interpenetration and the 
opposition of the “own” and the “other” in self-
consciousness that occur in the consciousness 
returned back into itself (and also in the object 
returned into itself) due to the formation of self-
consciousness.
Hegel personifies this logical conclusion as 
“reduplication of self-consciousness”, thereby 
giving it a real definition. Personification refers to 
the relations of two individuals, i.e. an individual 
as the “own” (own self-consciousness) and an 
individual as the “other” (other self-consciousness), 
though, of course, both individuals live within 
my own ego. As before the establishment of self-
consciousness the perception and the mind force 
a person to abandon himself and see “himself in 
the other” (ibid, p.99), at the initial stage of the 
self-consciousness establishment the “own” and 
the “other” compose an immediate integrity, 
recognizing each other when brought together 
(ibid, p. 101). Applying this to the intellectual 
development process we may understand that one 
learns the results of previous feelings, perception 
and mind, and starts providing them in systems 
within himself. But it is not so smooth. The 
two individuals (two self-consciousnesses) are 
opposite to each other as a Bondsman and a Lord; 
there occurs the “fear of the death, the absolute 
master” that is overcome later. Here one’s own 
self-consciousness is seen as self-consciousness 
of a Bondsman. Hegel writes: “The truth of 
the independent consciousness is accordingly 
the consciousness of the bondsman… Being 
consciousness repressed within itself, it (bondage – 
E.K.) will enter into itself, and change round into 
real and true independence” (ibid, 101). Let us 
apply it to the intellectual process one more time. 
The truth that manifests itself “beyond itself” at 
first, is obviously the truth of the mind knowledge, 
as it is not the truth of self-consciousness. But this 
truth of the mind brings us to the “bondage”, i.e. 
gets pushed away. This is how it usually happens: 
if one learns by understanding something, then he 
“pushes it away” in order to get over subjectivity. 
Indeed, it is a necessary process. The axis of 
the consciousness is in the external object. The 
consciousness returned into itself gets over the 
bondage and considers the knowledge of mind 
again from the axis within itself. In the process 
of this new consideration, it makes up the image 
of the world for itself, forming its own system of 
knowledge. When one masters his own logic and 
its own competence and reaches the “free self-
consciousness” (ibid, p. 107), they are already 
in the phase that refers to the field of the reason. 
Hegel believes that this is when “thinking” 
begins to work more than ever, and the object 
starts moving in concepts, not in images or ideas. 
These are, first of all, the “concepts for oneself” 
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and “my concepts”. According to Vygotsky, 
this is the self-consciousness as “consciousness 
of consciousness” (or to be more precise, the 
thing – consciousness – consciousness). But 
we should not take self-consciousness as meta-
consciousness, for it presents only one side of the 
problem. We need to understand that the concept 
is my concept; therefore, the “consciousness of 
consciousness” is also individual.
Therefore, one of the meanings of “free 
self-consciousness” by Hegel is the fact that the 
relations between subjectivity and objectivity 
(objectivity as avoidance of subjectivity) turns 
around, opening a new relation between them 
(from the objectivity of the mind to a deeper 
objectivity, for which we look into subjectivity).
(notes) An illustrated children’s book “The 
Big Book of Philosophical Opposites” 
(2007 // 2011) written by French philosopher 
Oscar Brenifier, has been translated into 
many languages. It is a really popular 
and iconic book. One of its main features 
are the pictures used for argumentation 
instead of words. Of course, the book 
presents manifold philosophic concepts 
for children. Through communication it 
is possible to make a positive educational 
impact on a child. Its other feature is the 
clearness of presenting Hegel’s philosophy. 
The books speaks of Integrity and Plurality, 
Finite and Infinite, Existence and External, 
Freedom and Necessity, Reason and Sense, 
Nature and Culture, Time and Eternity, I 
and Others, Body and Mind, Active and 
Passive, Objective and Subjective, Cause 
and Consequence. Each of the topics is 
consequently studied in the opposition and 
integrity.
The part of “objective and subjective” 
is quoted from this book.
“When we are sad we claim the glass 
is half-empty; when we a happy we think it 
is half-full. We can measure the amount of 
water in the glass to say how much of water 
there is”.
Together with that, when the scientists 
discovered that the Earth is round, that 
heavy objects still can fly, that diseases are 
caused by microbes, they were accused of 
spreading dangerous delusions or even of 
being crazy. When a musician or a poet 
expresses their feelings with music or 
poetry, the others feel that the subjective art 
expresses their own emotions, such as love, 
suffering, joy…
Therefore, to reach objectivity, 
sometimes it is required to leave all the 
subjective behind, and sometimes it takes 
to listen to it” (p. 72).
The example of the glass demonstrates 
the “cancellation of the subjective”; the 
example of the scientists, musicians 
and poets illustrates “listening to the 
subjective”.
We can illustrate the example of 
the scientists with a modern event. For 
example, the discovery (creation) of one 
of the universal cells, or iPS-cell began 
with a (subjective) dream of Professor 
Yamanaka that a human can restore a 
cell just like a gecko can restore a cut 
finger. When the universal cell was found 
through cultivation of 4 cores in a cell 
of human skin, and when the existence 
of the cell was proved in multiple 
institutions all over the world, the 
Professor’s dream became the objective 
truth. This is an exclusive example of 
the subjective, originated together with 
self-consciousness, providing reasonable 
knowledge of something new. Turning the 
subjective into the objective, penetration 
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into the “inner nature” of a thing are the 
base of the professor’s discovery. 
VI  Connection with Spinoza’s Pattern  
of Emotions Development
1
Before we look at how Spinoza’s theory of 
emotions should be understood, we will simply 
write about “how Vygotsky read Spinoza”.
(1) Vygotsky considers Spinoza’s theory as 
an antithesis to the Cartesian theory. Critically 
analyzing Fischer’s idea of continuity between 
Descartes and Spinoza, Vygotsky suggests that 
Spinoza, even in his early work “Short Treatise” 
examines the relation of ideas and emotions, 
which the Cartesian “organic theory of emotions” 
does not include, as if the “other side of the 
moon” (1933/1984, p.167). If we can consider one 
side of the history of philosophy as a wave of a 
thesis and an antithesis, then, as Hegel later put 
the antithesis to the Spinozist idea of substance 
turning this substance in the absolute idea, “so 
Spinoza in his time presented an antithesis in 
relation to Descartes, but a materialist antithesis” 
(1933/1984, p.170).
(2) Vygotsky grasps elements of the 
dialectic in Spinoza’s theory, a vivid example 
of which is the idea of “free necessity” 
determined by the Spinozist definitions of God. 
The concepts of “freedom”, “obligation” and 
«need» are defined as follows: “Such a thing 
is called free that exists only because of the 
necessity of its own nature and is determined 
to action by itself alone”; “Such a thing is 
called obliged that is determined to existence 
and action in accordance with the known and 
certain pattern” (Ethics, Part 1, Definition 
7). Therefore, the freedom during the action 
appears out of its interior necessity. In this 
sense, “free necessity” is applicable only to 
God or nature as a whole. 
This is the definition in the order of the 
substance, and in the order of the theory of 
knowledge, Spinoza wrote: “I believe freedom is 
not a free decision (decretum), but a free necessity 
(libera nécessitas) – (1999II, P.512, Letter 58). In 
the book about politics he also said: “... freedom 
... does not eliminate the necessity of acting, but 
assumes it” (ibid, p.256, Politics, ch.2, p.11).
Moreover, Vygotsky found “dialectical 
negation” in the words of Spinoza: “Even as light 
displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a 
standard both of itself and of falsity” (Ethics, Part 
2, Prop. 43, Note). For example, at the beginning 
of his work “The Problem of Development in 
Structural Psychology. Critical Study”, Vygotsky 
wrote: “In this work we want to study the 
problem of development in structural psychology. 
The objective of this study is to separate true 
from false in this theory. ...... We will build our 
research on what is true in this theory, and use 
it to reveal false positions it contains, while 
truth, in accordance with the great thought of 
Spinoza, illuminates both itself and delusion” 
(1934/1982, p. 238). Specifically, truth here is the 
principle of “structure” itself and “delusion” is 
an undeveloped nature of this structure, which 
cannot get the qualitative difference between 
instinct and intellectual actions of an animal 
and a human. Vygotsky wrote: “If we follow this 
principle, we should acknowledge that since the 
whole structure, the whole system of the human 
consciousness is different from the structure of 
the animal consciousness, identification of any 
partial element of this or that structure (intellectual 
operations) is impossible, while the meaning of 
this element becomes clear only in the light of the 
whole of which it is a part” (ibid, p.268). Simply 
speaking, the truth of determining parts by the 
structure reveals the delusion of identifying some 
parts of different structures. This understanding 
of the Spinozist idea allows to get all the positive 
ideas from the past and current theories. 
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(3) Vygotsky wrote about Spinoza's theory 
of proportions and modern psychoneurology as 
follows: “Consideration of Spinoza’s theory about 
passions in the light of modern psychoneurology 
in fact cannot be equally a revision of the current 
state of the issue regarding the nature of emotions 
in the light of Spinoza’s theory about passions” 
(1933 / 1984, p.101). Herewith, neuropsychiatric 
theories that Vygotsky mainly takes into account 
are: the theory of James-Lange as an organic 
theory of emotions, which considers physical 
condition to cause emotions, and Cannon-Bard’s 
theory, indicating a double control of emotions 
through the thalamus and the cerebral cortex.
What theory of psychoneurology do the 
Spinozist definitions of emotions refer to? 
First of all, in terms of psychoneurology the 
definition is as follows: “By emotion I mean the 
modifications of the body (corporis affectiones), 
whereby the active power of the said body is 
increased or diminished, aided or constrained, 
and also the ideas of such modifications” (Ethics, 
Part 3, Definition 3). This definition can be also 
interpreted from the standpoint of the organic 
theory of emotions. However, in his early book 
‘Educational Psychology”, Vygotsky tried to 
reveal the essence of emotions on the basis of 
the theory of James-Lange. Nevertheless, in 
his late manuscript “The Theory of Emotions”, 
containing the results of neuropsychiatric study, 
Vygotsky again discusses the definition given 
above in terms of the theory of Cannon-Bard. 
From the point of view that emotions are the 
state of the body, one can also consider these 
states both as the cause of the emotions and 
their effect. Considering Cannon’s factual study, 
Vygotsky began to incline to the interpretation in 
terms of the theory of Cannon-Bard. Vygotsky 
believed that Cannon’s early research had “the 
experimental evidence of the dynamogenous 
influence of emotions lifting the individual to a 
higher level of activity” (1933/1984, p.101-2). This 
study illustrates similar bodily reactions in case 
of different emotions, the same bodily reactions 
in case of emotional and unemotional experience, 
such as pain, choking, etc. (See 1933/1984, 
Chapter 3). This is sharp criticism of the organic 
theory of emotions. 
Moreover, the theory of emotions that 
Spinoza mentions in his “Short Treatise” and also 
in “Ethics”, is the theory of emotions stemming 
from the ideas that there is a link between thinking 
and emotions. Since in terms of psychoneurology 
such links should involve the cerebral cortex, the 
organic theory of emotions (in fact, peripheral 
theory) loses its force in relation to this problem. 
Therefore, James is not convincing considering 
the essence of “delicate emotions”,» although he 
vividly describes and displays “crude emotions”. 
Ideas of Jackson and Kretschmer referring to the 
control of the lower functions through the higher 
functions (if the control is weakened due to any 
reason, the lower functions appear independently), 
supports the theory of Cannon-Bard. Therefore, 
it allows us to explain both “delicate” and “crude 
emotions” in terms of psychoneurology.
(4) Therefore, Spinoza’s theory trying to 
grasp not only the connection between the body 
and emotions, but also the link between thinking 
and emotions, is holistically covered by the theory 
of Cannon-Bard in terms of psychoneurology. 
Nevertheless, Vygotsky was not satisfied by this 
theory, while not all Spinoza’s ideas are outlined 
by such psychoneurology. If there is a development 
from the lower to the higher functions in the field 
of emotions, we have to explain the turn of the 
development from the link body-emotions to the 
link thought-emotions, and moreover, from the 
emotions that make “thinking move in a certain 
direction” ( 1935/1983, p.249), to the emotions 
that move thinking. Vygotsky finds revelation of 
this issue in Spinoza’s ideas. 
Such revolution is based on the fact that the 
knowledge of emotions changes them. Vygotsky 
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wrote: “Spinoza was right saying that getting 
to know our affect changes it, and turns from 
a passive to an active state. When I think of 
things that are beyond me, they did not change, 
but when I think of affects, when I put them in 
a different relationship to my intelligence and 
other levels, it makes many changes in my mental 
life” (1930/1982, p.125-6). If we consider an 
external thing many times, it will never change, 
even though we come closer to its essence. But 
considering emotions can change them because 
it allows to consider emotions in the new system 
with intelligence.
Nevertheless, here we discuss the positions 
of Spinoza that Vygotsky relies on. Probably, 
besides the already mentioned definition (Ethics, 
Part 3, Definition 3), he also takes into account 
the following Spinozist statements. That is 
to say, “as long as we do not worry about the 
affects contrary to our nature, until then we 
retain the ability to put the states of the body in 
order in accordance with the pattern of the mind 
(intellectus)” (Part 5, Prop. 10); “ideas of ideas 
of such modifications [of the body]” (Part 2, 
Prop. 22 Proof). Moreover, I suppose Vygotsky 
considers the following speech of Spinoza: 
“everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly 
understanding himself and his emotions, if not 
absolutely, at any rate in part” (Part 5, Prop. 4, 
Scholium); “one cannot invent any other remedy 
against affects that would be in our power, that 
would be better than their true understanding, 
while ... ... there is no other psychic ability but 
the ability of thinking and generating adequate 
ideas» (ibid) . Here Spinoza considers the 
problem of self-consciousness, understanding 
of emotions as a part of this problem. Thus, 
what exists in the ideas of Spinoza, but is not 
present in the psychoneurological research, is 
the emergence of self-consciousness, which 
lifts “crude emotions” preserving human life 
to cultural “delicate emotions”, moves lower 
emotions to higher emotions, moving the link 
body-emotion to thought-emotion. 
2
Moving from lower emotions to the highest 
emotions and the transformation of the link 
body-emotions to the link thought-emotions 
through self-consciousness (getting to know your 
emotions as a part of it) means the development 
of emotions, and especially the point of the turn. 
Thus, Vygotsky found the theory of emotions 
development in the theory of emotions of 
Spinoza. 
When we consider Spinoza’s theory 
of emotions from the point of view of 
development basing on Vygotsky’s conclusions, 
we can determine five phases of emotions’ 
development.
(1) The first phase is the emotion as “a 
modification of the body” (Ethics, Part 3, 
Definition 3). We consider it as the initial 
emotion within the range “conatus – appetite – 
desire”, which is the state serving to “self-
preservation” of the human. Spinoza wrote 
about it as follows. 
This endeavour (for self-preservation – 
E.K.) when referred solely to the mind, is 
called will, when referred to the mind and 
body in conjunction it is called appetite 
(appetitus); it is, in fact, nothing else but 
man’s essence, from the nature of which 
necessarily follow all those results which 
tend to its preservation; and which man has 
thus been determined to perform. Further, 
between appetite and desire (cupiditas) 
there is no difference, except that the term 
desire is generally applied to men, in so far 
as they are conscious of their appetite, and 
may accordingly be thus defined: desire is 
appetite with consciousness thereof (Ethics, 
Part 3, Prop. 9, Note).
– 1783 –
Eiji Kamiya. Problem of Self-consciousness and Conceptual Thinking in theTheory of Vigotsky: in the Spirit…
As shown above, the definition of emotions 
as the state of the body can tolerate the theory 
of James-Lange. However, it seems to us that in 
the early period of his study Vygotsky approved 
the organic theory of emotions in the basis of 
Spinoza’s definition of emotions, but later he 
reconsidered the idea and refused it (see the 
book “Teaching About Emotions”, Ch. 9). 
Vygotsky also realized the ruin of the organic 
theory of emotions in terms psychoneurology 
because one concept of emotions as “ the states 
of the body” cannot explain the development of 
emotions.
(2) The second phase is the emotion as “the 
idea of the modification of the body”, which 
Spinoza wrote about in the definition 3 given 
above. In the words of Vygotsky, this emotion 
is “any affective impulse that puts it [thinking] 
in motion and under control”. Taking into 
consideration the Spinozist definition of emotions, 
Vygotsky wrote as follows. 
As our actions do not occur without 
a reason, and move in accordance with 
the known dynamic processes, needs 
and affective impulses, so our thinking is 
always motivated, always psychologically 
conditioned, always derived from some 
affective impulse, which puts it into 
motion and directs. Thinking that is 
dynamically unmotivated is as impossible 
as a groundless action. In this sense, even 
Spinoza determines the emotion capable of 
increasing or decreasing the ability of the 
body to act and makes thinking move in a 
certain direction (1935/1983, p. 249).
Vygotsky’s phrase: “Spinoza defines the 
emotion anything that increases or decreases the 
ability of our body to act and makes thinking 
move in a certain direction”, clearly takes into 
account the above definition 3 in Part 3 of the 
book “Ethics”. And the words: emotion “makes 
thinking move in a certain direction”, seems to 
me, correspond to the Spinozist statement, “the 
idea of modifications of the body”.
Here the above written words “in a 
particular direction” are important. As Spinoza 
stated that “modifications of the body, whereby 
the active power of the said body is increased 
or diminished, aided or constrained”,i.e. the 
emotion “increases or decreases the ability of 
our mind to think, favours or restricts it” (Part 
3 Prop.11), the directions in which the emotion 
moves the mind can be more than one. One 
direction is that the emotion breathes strength in 
thinking, and because of this thinking becomes 
deeper and more accurate. Nevertheless, the 
opposite direction is possible, when the emotion 
distracts thinking, and in this terms there is a 
delay of thinking. Spinoza considers the second 
direction as “bondage”. Spinoza wrote in this 
regard: “Human infirmity in moderating and 
checking the emotions I name bondage: for, 
when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not 
his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: 
so much so, that he is often compelled, while 
seeing that which is better for him, to follow 
that which is worse” (Part 4, Preface). It is here 
where the turn in the development of emotions 
is necessary for the further development of the 
man. 
(3) We have already pointed at the content of 
this turn. Simply put, it is the formation of self-
consciousness and learning of their emotions as 
a part of this formation, which is the third phase 
of development of emotions. According to the 
abstract expression, these are “ideas of ideas of 
modifications [of the body]” (Part 2, Prop. 22 
Proof). 
(4) Therefore, in the fourth phase emotions 
after the turn appear, i.e. emotions, which are 
moved by thinking. Vygotsky wrote as follows in 
this regard. 
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The basis of Spinoza's theory is the 
following. He was a determinist and, unlike 
the Stoics, argued that man has power over 
emotions, that the mind can change the order 
and connection of passions and bring them 
into conformity with the order and links 
given in the mind. Spinoza expressed the 
true genetic relationship. Human emotions 
in the course of ontogenetic development 
get into relation with general sets and in 
respect to self-consciousness of the person 
and in relation of consciousness of reality 
(1930/1982, c.125).
As stated above, this fourth phase is well 
characterized by the following words of Vygotsky, 
“man has the power over emotions”; “The mind 
can change the order and connection of passions 
and bring them into conformity with the order 
and links given in the mind”. In the “Short 
Treatise”, Spinoza typically shows this feature as 
emotions derived from thinking. Nevertheless, 
we should note that if we have learned only this 
phase or the fifth phase, we would have made an 
intellectual understanding of emotions. It seems 
that the first phase without connections to other 
phases allows the theory of emotions of James – 
Lange. But when we understand the transition of 
the link “body – emotions” to the link “thought – 
emotions” and the development of emotions as a 
whole, Spinoza’s theory of emotions appears to 
reject the organic theory of emotions and also on 
intellectual understanding.
(5) From emotions driven by the intelligence 
at the fourth phase we get to the fifth phase which 
is defined in accordance with the following 
proposition by Spinoza: “From this third kind 
of knowledge arises the highest possible mental 
acquiescence” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 27). To prove 
this proposition Spinoza wrote: “The highest 
virtue of the mind is to know God or to understand 
things by the third kind of knowledge” (Ethics, 
Part 5, Prop. 27 Proof). Here we are talking about 
what God is for Spinoza, and what is the third 
kind of knowledge. 
My interpretation of the first question is that 
God is a “free necessity” for Spinoza considering 
the substance as “god or nature”. It is not a forced 
and fatal necessity, but also the necessity that 
liberates man. 
Well, what is the third kind of knowledge? 
Spinoza identified the first kind of knowledge 
as “opinion” that is “knowledge through chaotic 
experience” and as “imagining” things when we 
remember a thing as a sign or a word, and through 
this memory we form a certain idea. He considers 
the second kind of knowledge as “reason (ratio)”, 
that is, “common notions and adequate ideas 
of the properties of things”. Furthermore, he 
defines the third kind of knowledge as “intuitive 
knowledge”. Specifically, he wrote: “This kind of 
knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the 
absolute essence of certain attributes of God to 
the adequate knowledge of the essence of things” 
(Part 2, Prop. 40, Note). At the same time, he 
wrote: “in proportion as we understand things 
more in this way, we better understand God” 
(Chapter 5, Prop. 25 Proof). The fact that in some 
attribute of God, for example, in the prospect of 
necessity, we get to know things, that through 
this the necessity itself becomes more precise and 
richer – it may be a feature of the third kind of 
knowledge. 
Thus, we come to the final question: what 
do the following Spinoza’s words mean: “higher 
emotional satisfaction, which can only be” or “the 
highest virtue of the mind”? I think they mean 
the freedom of man.
Returning to Spinoza’s early work “Short 
Treatise”, we can find the phrase: “the true 
freedom of man, which emerges from the fourth 
kind of knowledge” (1999I, p.8). This “fourth 
kind of knowledge” corresponds to the “third 
kind of knowledge” in the “Ethics”, and this 
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way of learning preserves connection with God. 
Spinoza in his work “Short Treatise” identified 
the freedom of man as follows.
It [human freedom] is a strong 
existence that our mind gets due to the 
direct connection with God, so as to cause 
the ideas inside itself and actions outside 
itself consistent with its nature; and the 
actions should not be subject to any external 
causes, which could change or convert them 
(1999I, p.164).
Once again, let us emphasize that God in 
Spinoza’s works is a free necessity, which speaking 
of “cognitive love of the mind for God” (Ethics, 
Part 5, Prop. 36), is no love without an attribute 
and not religious love; Spinoza considers this love 
as the third kind of knowledge. Thus, the freedom 
of man is “the highest emotional satisfaction” or 
“the highest virtue of the mind”.
Herewith, we can learn the meaning of 
freedom contained in the words of Vygotsky, cited 
earlier in this article: “The emotion’s concept is 
an active state; it is freedom”, “Freedom: emotion 
in concept”, “the great picture of personality 
development: the way to freedom”. These words 
are understood immediately in the fifth phase 
of emotions. Nevertheless, we can understand 
that the phrase “ability to clearly and distinctly 
know themselves and their emotions (Chapter 
5, Prop. 4, Note) it means the way to freedom in 
the development of personality, because Spinoza 
considers the “human infirmity in moderating 
and checking the emotions” as “bondage”. Here 
we find the problem of identity in terms of 
emotions. And it coincides with Hegel’s “free self-
consciousness”, defined in terms of intelligence. 
Of course, intelligence and emotions have no 
direct logical parallelism. Because each of them 
has its own peculiarity in relation to development. 
The higher and the lower functions in the human 
intelligence are related to the capture of the 
second by the first. However, as Vygotsky points 
out, the appearance of schizophrenia or aphasia 
gives autonomy to the lower functions dependent 
on the higher functions before the emergence of 
the disease. And then there are disintegration of 
conceptual thinking, secondary manifestation 
of complex thinking, variance of meaningful 
perception. But the higher and the lower layers of 
human emotions are not the same in the case with 
intelligence. The lower layers are easily shown 
without the disease, when there is some kind of 
an unusual situation: unknown condition, high 
alcohol intake, sudden life crisis, etc. That is, 
the phases of emotions do not form such a strict 
dependence as in case with the development of 
intelligence and alternately come to the first stage 
as if simultaneously detected. Cannon-Bard’s 
theory shows these neurological reasons, and 
according to this theory, the lower layers relate 
to the self-preservation of life. This is a peculiar 
feature of these five phases unlike the phases of 
the intellectual development.
Conclusion: Self-Consciousness  
as a Salutation  
to the Second Birth of Man
The philosophical foundations of Vygotsky’s 
theory are based on the mental development 
scheme by Hegel and the emotional development 
scheme by Spinoza. Given the above, we can see 
that these cross in the consciousness. If we briefly 
speak about the value of self-consciousness, which 
provides the two schemes and their intersection, 
self-consciousness is a salutation to the “second 
birth of man”, of which Rousseau said as a poet 
with the power of intuition.
At the same time, it allows us to evaluate 
the modern psychological theories. For example, 
based on the theory of self-consciousness, how 
should we evaluate Piaget? He put the concept 
of “self” in the study of cognitive development 
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through the concept of “cognitive egocentrism” 
and “decentralization”. If we call the argument 
based solely on one’s own experiment 
cognitive egocentrism, if you call its collapse 
decentralization, these concepts by Piaget 
explain cognitive development up to12 years 
well. However, when considering the emotions 
only as the energy for learning, Piaget does not 
exceed the parallelism between the intellect and 
the emotions, the “bondage” of uncontrollable 
emotions, which Spinoza pointed at, is out of 
his viewpoint. Nevertheless, the main boundary 
in the theory of intellectual development 
Piaget is that he does not have a theory of self-
consciousness, and so he cannot move from the 
mind to the reason, if we use the concepts of 
Hegel. Decentralization deprives subjectivity of 
the learning process. But immediately after the 
completion of decentralization, the “self” begins 
to form at the new stage – self-consciousness 
(according to Vygotsky, the crisis of 13 years 
takes place). The fact that one of those new 
formations is the subjective in a new form, which 
will lead us to the higher objective. In Piaget’s 
theory there is no dynamics of decentralization 
and self-consciousness after the dynamics of 
cognitive centralization and decentralization in 
the ontogenetic development. In other words, 
there is no dynamic motion between mind and 
reason, between the subjective and the objective. 
Thus, Piaget could not provide the second birth of 
man in his theory. This is an essential limit to the 
theory of Piaget. 
However, Vygotsky's theory was also 
unfinished. In the 30s he passionately expanded 
the field of his studies. I think in the 30s 
Vygotsky developed his theory in three ways. 
That is, he not only developed (1) the theory of 
development through speech as mediation, but 
also (2) the theory of personality development 
(specifically speaking, age psychology, specific 
psychology and psychology of the drama of 
an individual), and (3) the theory of emotions 
development rooted in the unity of body and 
spirit, and psychological systems. However, 
since his life was not long, he could not write 
the axis connecting these paths. One of our 
goals in respect of such theory by Vygotsky 
is the exact description and understanding 
of the integrity of his theory. This is a very 
hard work, but given the above, we come to 
a certain conclusion that without relying on 
the “Phenomenology of Spirit” by Hegel and 
“Ethics” by Spinoza we cannot fully understand 
Vygotsky, his ideas about self-consciousness 
and conceptual thinking. 
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Проблема самосознания и понятийного мышления  
в теории Выготского: в духе «Феноменологии духа» Гегеля  
и «Этики» Спинозы
Эйдзи Камия 
Университет Киото-тачибана 
34 Yamada-cho Oyake, Yamashina-ku, Kyoto 607-8175, Japan
В статье раскрывается, как философии Гегеля и Спинозы связаны с самой глубиной 
теории Л.С. Выготского (1896-1934), которая продолжает жить как одна из современных 
психологических теорий. Наша мотивация такого изучения заключается в том, чтобы 
обогатить теорию Выготского, находящуюся незаконченной из-за краткости его жизни. 
Иными словами, из философии Гегеля Выготский принял не только диалектический способ 
мышления, но идею самосознания как осознание понятия и произвольное мышление. В теории 
Спинозы же он рассмотрел психофизическую проблему об эмоциях и одновременно связи 
«эмоций – понятии – свободы», суть которых заключает в себе «познание о себе и о своих 
аффектах», или самосознание. Таким образом, исходя из идей Выготского, мы находим, что 
два крупных философа подлинно пересекаются в идее самосознания. Это начало в таком 
пути обогащения теории Выготского, которое идет не только от рождения сознания 
к самосознанию как второму рождению человека, но и обратно – от второго к первому 
рождению сознания.
Ключевые слова: самосознание, понятие, эмоции, развитие, диалектика.
Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.
